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Introduction
Reagan administration sponsored reductions in government
support have forced social workers to adopt service delivery
strategies oriented toward conserving resources rather than
expanding the provision of services. The emphasis toward
efficiency in service provision has had a detrimental effect
on the supply of service. Gilbert (1983) maintains that since
the mid-1970's, government funding has become more readily
available to organizations serving fee paying, middle income
consumers. As organization priorities have shifted in order
to qualify for Federal monies, fewer programs provide services
exclusively for poor clients.
Recent studies by Ostrander (1985) and Gronbjerg (1986)
confirm that social welfare organizations have reduced access
to services for. the poor in response to the Reagan bUdget
cuts. Although a few researchers (Hasenfeld, 1985. Lipsky,
1980) have identified income-tested eligibility requirements
as the primary strategy used by organizations to limit client
access, additional strategies used by organizations to control
service provision have largely not been addressed in the
empirical literature. The utilization of access strategies
that promote consumer control of service provision (advocacy,
citizen participation, and the employment of indigenous staff)
have also not been documented. Consumer-oriented delivery
strategies have their roots in the social reform movement of
the 1960's and may have been abandoned as a consequence of
Reagan era efficienco' goals (Hardina, 1988). This paper
examines consumer control in organizations serving three low
income communities in Chicago in 1985 subsequent to the Reagan
budget cuts.
Literature Review
During periods of government retrenchment, social welfare
organizations are faced with the problem of obtaining new
sources of funding while maximiz ing consumer access.
Dependent on funding from government agencies, foundations,
and individual donors, organizations are obligated to comply
wi th government regulations, foundation priori ties, and the
demands of community residents (Blau, 1964. Hasenfeld,1984).
According to Blau all helping behavior takes place in the
context of power-dependency relationships between resource
rich donors and resource poor recipients. A person (or
organization) who possesses resources and who supplies
services on demand to others obligates them to reciprocate.
By providing benef,i ts in a one-\,ay exchange, a donor who
accumulates obligations can require compliance to his or her
wishes and thus gain power. The recipient's change in
behavior serves to "repay" the donor for his or her services.
Recipients have four alternatives with which to avoid
compliance with the donor's demands:
- they can obtain the service from another source
they can supply the donor with a service of equal value
they can coerce the donor to provide the service
- they can learn to live without the service (pp. 118-119),
Hasenfeld (1984)'argues that in order to cope with resource
scarcity and fiscal uncertainty, organizations will turn to
funding sources external to the community served. Power is
likely to be concentrated in those external units in which
fiscal resources are located. In order to surv i ve, soc ial
welfare organizations may become "captives" of large donors,
"doing their political and ideological bidding" (p.525).
Fiscal constraints force organizations to choose between
securing needed resources or organization autonomy.
Consequently, organizations may abandon programs that are not
consistent with the interests of the dominant donors. Non-
profit organizations can attempt to generate alternative
sources of power by raising funds locally or developing
powerful boards of directors.
Tourginy and Miller (1981) argue that the locus of
responsibility for policy-making in community-based
organizations is solely a funct ion of the organization's
source of funding and the degree of attachment to the local
community. Organizations that receive funding exclusively
from sources external to the community and that have weak
communi ty representation on the i r boards have 1 ittIe input
into developing the policies that govern their organization.
Policy is generated by government agencies or foundation
directors. In organizations that receive funding exclusively
from sources internal to the community (grass-roots fund-
raising), policy is made by organization participants with
input from community residents. Tourginy and Miller suggests
that the value of strong community representation is that the
board's advocacy on behalf of local residents will mitigate
against the regulatory demands of external funders. Policy
will be made by both the local board and the funding agency.
Strategies such as citizen participation, and hiring
clients are mechanisms that can be used by organization boards
to enhance the consumer's control over the provision of
services I Gilbert and Specht, 1986). The establishment of
formal citizen participation mechanisms allows clients to have
a role in determining the design and delivery of social
service programs (Burke, 1979). Hiring clients for staff
pos Lt ions 0 ften he Ips to br idge the cuI tural gaps that may
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occur between highly educated, professional workers and
residents of economically depressed, minority communities
(Katan,1974). This'access strategy empowers consumers by
enhancing communication between the organization and the
people it serves and by providing employment opportunities for
communi ty res idents. Advocacy can al so be oriented toward
empowering consumers. . Consumer or self-help advocacy as
defined by Sauber (1983) involves the use of influence or the
mobilization of pressure to achieve changes in service
quality.
Gilbert and Specht also identify two strategies commonly
used in organizations to enhance the control of professional
workers: rationing services through bureaucratic eligibility
procedures and the coordination of services. Control of
service delivery is maintained through the enforcement of
income related eligibility requirements and the rationing of
services. Income-testing is often accompanied by stigmatizing
worker behavior and intrusive requests for personal
information. Consequently, applicants may be discouraged from
seeking service (Lipsky, 1980. Prottas, 1981). Coordination
efforts often involve "interventions which clients an not
coordinate for themselves" and have a tendency to become
oriented toward the needs of program managers rather than
increasing client access to services (Kahn and Kamerman,
1978). Gilbert and Specht (1986) believe that professional
control strategies and strategies used to empower consumer's
are mutually exclusive. Organizations are oriented toward
either consumer or professional control.
Client-exclusive organizations limit access to service by
employing only service professionals, excluding 'clients from
participation in decision making, and narrowly defining
eligibility for service. Alternatively, a consumer-inclusive
organizations employs community residents and encourages
citizen participation and self-help oriented advocacy
(Hardina, 1988). The difference between a client and a
consumer involves the recipient's relationship with the
service provider. The consumer has a choice among diverse
services agencies and individual providers. A client on the
other hand, enters into a power-dependency relationship in
which he/she will be "controlled by the helper". (Dewar,
1979: 248). The service provider has the power to determine
whether the client is "worthy" of assistance; the client is
dependent on the provider for continued access to goods,
services, and information about organization policies and
procedures.
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Methodologv
The research question addressed by this paper concerns the
impact of funding sources and organization structure on
consumer control of social welfare organizations. The
influence of both funding sources and organization boards
determine the type of access strategies used by the
organization; these strategies will exclude clients from
receiving services or include consumers in organization
decision-making and service delivery (Rein, 1983,. This paper
examines three hypotheses:
- External funding (government and foundation)
community board representation are negatively
with consumer control in organizations.
and weak
associated
- External funding (government and foundation) and strong
community boards are positively associated with consumer
control in organizations.
Internal funding (grass-root) is positively associated
with consumer control in organizations. (See Figure)
Consumer control is defined as
advocacy, citizen participation,
clients and the absence of income
the presence of self-help
and the hiring of former
testing and coordination.
Fifty-three social welfare organizations serving three
Chicago communities were surveyed by researchers at the School
of Urban Planning and Policy at the University of Illinois,
Chicago during the Summer of 1985. Questionnaires were mailed
to organization directors and follow-up interviews were
conducted in order to determine the effects of funding sources
and board representation on the organization's use of service
delivery strategies. The study population included all the
social welfare organizations serving the communities of Little
Village, Austin, and East Side. The response rate was 80%.
These communities were selected in order to reflect both
economic hardship and ethnic diversity. One community is
primarily Hispanic, one is primarily black, and the third
contains a majority of residents who are white ethnics. The
respondent organizations included seven branch offices of
public agencies, 10 food pantries, and 36 non-profit
organizations.
The data analysis portion of the study employed a minxture
of regression, cross-tabulation, and qualitative analysis to
examine the influence of board members and funders in
determing the manner in which services are delivered in low
income communi ties. A It consumer control" scale was
constructed to measure the degree of consumer accesS to
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aIMPACT OF FUNDING AND BOARD REPRESENTATIOK
ON ACCESS CONTROL STRATEGIES
COMMUNITY BOARDS
Weak Strong
CLIENT-EXCLUSIVE
( low consumer control)
CONSUMER-INCLUSIVE
(high consumer control)
EXTERNAL
Fl;NDING
(Govern-
ment &
Founda-
tion)
Coordination
Income-testing
No Clients Are Hired
No Self-help Advocacy
No Citizen Participation
No Coordination
No income-testing
Clients are Hired
Self-help Advocacy
Citizen Participation
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Figure: Typology of access strategy utilization in social
welfare organizations. organizations.
aAdapted from Gilbert and Specht (1974) and Tourginy and
Miller (1981).
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Citizen Participation
CONSUMER-INCLUSIVE
(high consumer control)
No Coordination
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Self-help Advocacy
Citizen Participation
CONSUMER-INCLUSIVE
(high consumer control)
INTERNAL
FUNDING
(Grass-
roots)
services and decision-making processes in the surveyed
organizations. Consumer control was measured using a five
point summated scale that measures the presence (1) or absence
(0) of access strategies oriented toward increasing the power
of service consumers. These strategies as defined by Gilbert
and Specht (1986), Sauber (1983), and Lipsky (1980) are: the
presence of self-help advocacy, citizen participation, and
hiring former clients and the absence of income-testing and
coordination. The organization's largest source of funding
and the percentage of both community residents and clients on
the organization's board of directors were the independent
variables.
Funding source was measured using the organization's
largest source of funding. The funding categories included:
government (federal, state, local), foundation (private
foundations, corporate donors and the United Way), and grass-
roots support (individual contributions, fund-raising events,
and in-kind donations). The degree of resident and client
representation on the board were measured using two continuous
variables: the percentage of community residents on the board
and the percentage of clients on the board. Budget size and
neighborhood were used as control variables.
Linear regression was used to examine the interaction of
funding sources and board composition on the level of consumer
control in the organization, controlling for both budget size
and neighborhood. This analysis was supplemented through the
use of a typology of organizations that describes the degree
of consumer control in organizations by largest funding source
and board representation.
Results
Tourginy and Miller (1981) argue that funding sources and
board representation impact on the degree of consumer control
in organizations. In order to test this assumption,
statistically, a consumer control scale has been constructed
by adding positive responses for the presence of the following
access strategies in each of the surveyed organizations:
- self-help advocacy
citizen participation (involvement of clients in
planning)
- hiring clients
- no income-testing to determine eligibility
- no coordination (joint programs and plans).
Scores on the scale range from a low of "0" to a high of "5".
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Only one of the organizations is rated "5" on the scale.
Three organizat ions, s,ix percent 0 f the total, have a rating
of four, Only one organization is rated "0". Ninety percent
have mid-range scores of 1'1", 1'2'1 or 113'f. The average score
on the consumer control scale is 2.04 (see Table 1), Although
the organization's largest funding source does influence
consumer control, budget size is also significant in determing
the degree of consumer access to services. Board
representation has a somewhat limited affect on consumer
control. The findings from the statistical test of the model
are presented below. Also discussed are the impact of both
funding source and budget size on service delivery in the
surveyed organizations and the interaction effects of funding
sources and board representation. A typology 0 f org ani za t ions
by funding source and budget size is also presented.
TABLE 1
THE DEGREE OF CONSUMER CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS
CONSUMER CONTROL SCORE FREQUENCY PERCENT
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The effect of funding and boards on consumer control: A
statistical test of the model
Three hypotheses are used to test whether funding sources
and board representation influence the degree of consumer
control in social welfare organizations. Hypothesis 1
postulates that external funding sources and weak community
board representation are negatively associated with consumer
control. Regression Modell explains 27% of the variation in
consumer control scores, but is not statistically significant,
having an F value of 1. 83 at p = 0.11). Hypothesis 1 is
rejected. (See Table 2).
2%
28%
43%
19%
6%
2%
100%53
1
15
23
10
3
1
Total
Zero
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
TABLE 2
i!
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF FUNDING SOURCES
AND BOARD REPRESENTATION ON CONSU~ER CONTROL
RAW REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
Kodel 3
(Grass-root
Funding)
>lodel 2
(External
Funding
Strong Board)
Kodel 1
(External
Funding
Weak Board)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Government 0.50 -0.32
Foundation 1.01 b
Grass-root -0.58
Resident Board
Client Board
Budget
Little Village
Austin
Government*
Resident Board
Government*
Client Board
Foundation*
Resident Board
Foundation*
Client Board
RSQ =
F =
p =
0.00
-0.00
0.88
-0.03
0.27
1. 83
0.27
0.00
0.00
3.68a
0.22
-0.22
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
RSQ = 0.47
F = 2.41
p = 0.03
RSQ =
F =
p =
-0.95
-0.27
0.21
3.22
0.02
aSignificant at <= 0.05
bSignificant at <= 0.10
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Hypothesis 2 states that the combination of external
funding and strong community board representation are
positively associated with consumer control. Regression Model
2 explains almost 50% of the variation (R-square) when budget
size and neighborhood are controlled in the degree of consumer
control and is statistically significant (with an F value of
2.41 at p = -0.03). Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed, however.
Of the two external funding variables (government and
foundation, only foundation funding is statistically
significant (and positively related) to consumer control.
Budget size, a control variable, also has a statistically
significant (and positive) relationship with consumer control.
Government funding, resident board representation, client
board representation, and the interaction effects of funding
sources and board representation are not statistically
significant in predicting consumer control in organizations.
Hypothesis 3 states that a positive relationship is assumed
between internal funding and consumer control regardless of
the strength of board representation. Regression Model 3,
controlling for neighborhood and budget size, explains 21% of
the total variance (R-square), in the degree of consumer
control and is significant (with and F value of 3.22 at p =
0.02). Grass-roots funding is negatively related to consumer
control and is not significant in predicting consumer control
in organizations, when budget size and neighborhood are
controlled. This hypothesis is also rejected.
Consllmer control as a function of budget size and funding
source
The ability to raise funds from outside the local community
is the most important factor in determining the level of
consumer control among the surveyed organizations. When
consumer control is examined solely by budget size, almost
85% of the organizations with low scores of "0" or "1" on the
consumer control scale have budgets of less than $100,000.
Sixty percent of the organizations with scores of "3" have
budgets over $100,000. Of the three organizations scoring
"4", two have budgets between $100,000 and $250,000, while the
remaining organization has a budget of less than $25,000. The
organization with a high score of "5" has a budget of
$4,000,000. The ability of the organization to control its
resources determines whether the organization utilizes
strategies to expand client access. Organizations with
limited ability to attract resources are the least likely to
establish mechanisms that enhance consumer control.
Organizations that receive their largest source of funding
from outs ide the local community, by and large, have the
abili ty to increase consumer access. Those organizations
receiving foundation funding rank higher on the consumer
control scale than organizations with government or grass-root
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support. Forty~two percent of the foundation tunded
organizations score.at least "3" on the scale compared to 22%
of the government funded organizations and 10% of the grass-
roots organizations. All of the three organizations ranked
"4" receive funding from foundations. The organization ranked
5" receives its largest funding source from government,
however. This organization also has the largest budget of all
the surveyed organizations. Low levels of consumer control
are also related to budget size. All of the grass-roots
funded organizations have budgets under $25,000 per year;
sixty percent of these organizations have low scores of "0"
or "1" on the consumer control scale. (See Table 3).
TABLE 3
LARGEST FUNDING SOURCE BY DEGREE OF CONSUMER CONTROL
CONSUMER LARGEST FUNDING SOURCE
CONTROL
Government Foundation Grass-root
Zero 1 ( 5%) 0 0%) 0 ( 0%)
One 6 ( 27%) 2 11%) 6 ( 60%)
Two 10 ( 45%) 9 47%) 3 ( 30%)
Three 4 ( 18%) 5 26%) 1 ( 10%)
Four 0 ( 0% ) 3 16%) 0 ( 0%)
Five 1 ( 5%) 0 0%) 0 ( 0%)
Total 22 (100%) 19 (100%) 10 (100%)
(N = 51)
The interaction of funding sources and board membership
Although board representation does not appear to mitigate
against the i~fluence of external funders, there is a strong
relationship between board representation and the largest
funding source used by the organization. Foundation funded
organizations are more likely than those receiving government
support to seat clients on their boards and have a majority
of board members who are res idents of the local community.
Fifty-percent of the government funded organizations have no
client members on their boards compared to 22% of those
organizations receiving their largest source of funding from
foundations. Grass-roots organizations are the least likely
to have either community or client representation. Of the 10
grass-roots organizations surveyed, six do not have formal
board structures. Of the four grass-roots organizations with
boards, only one has client members. (Hardina, 1988).
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A typologv of consumer control by funding source and board
representation
Tourginy and Miller (1981) argue that the degree of
community control in organizations in a function of both
funding sources and board representation. According to their
theory of policy-making in community-based organizations, the
degree of consumer control in decision-making should be weak
in organizations with little community board representation
that receive external funding and strong in organizations with
a high degree of community board representation and internal
funding. Organizations with strong boards and external
funding and organizations with informal structures should
exhibit a degree of consumer control which falls between these
two extremes. In order to examine whether assumpt ion holds
true for the surveyed organizations, a typology of
organizations has been created. For this study, the surveyed
organizations are classified by their largest source of
funding (government, foundation, grass-root) and by board
representation. The degree of board representation is divided
into three categories:
- low community resident and client representation.
- high community resident and low client representation.
- high community resident and client representation. l
The majority of the surveyed organizations receive either
government or foundation funding and have few clients on their
boards. Of the 10 government funded organizations with low
resident and client representation, seven are branch offices
of public agencies. In order to illustrate the combined
effect of funding sources and board representation on consumer
control (the presence of consumer-inclusive strategies of
access control and the absence of client-exclusive
strategies), a mean score on the consumer control scale has
been calculated for each of the eight sub-types of
organizations represented in the typology. (See Table 4).
Tourginy and Miller's contention that organization's funded
exclusively by local residents would have the highest degree
of local control is not supported by this study; these
organizations have the lowest mean score (1.5) on the consumer
control scale regardless of board representation. These
organizations have small budgets and ~re not able to sustain
formal access mechanisms.
lLow representation was judged to be less than 50%; high
representation was judged to be 50% or more.
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TABLE "'
TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: BY LARGEST
FUNDING SOURCE AND BOARD REPRESENTATION
(Number of Organizations and Mean
Consumer Control Scores)
EXTERNAL FUNDINGBOARD
REPRESEN-
TATION Government Foundation
INTERNAL FCNDgG
Grass-root
2 ( 2.0)
9. (2.0)
10 ( 1.9) 6 (1.:5)
"' (1.:5)
10 (1.5)
( 2 • 3 )
( 3. 0 )
( 2.:5 )
( 2 . 6 )
7
3
8
18( 1. 9)21
Low resident/
low client
High resident/
10v1 client
High resident/
high client
Total
N " 49
The argument that externally funded organizations with weak
community boards should have low control scores also does not
hold true. Government funded organizations have a mean
consumer control score of "2". Government funded
organizations tend to have larger budgets than foundation and
grass-roots supported organizations and can afford to hire
clients and promote other access enhancing strategies. Such
organizations are also affected by regulatory requirements
that limit access to services for some clients (such as
testing). There is no difference in the degree of consumer
control in government funded organizations by degree of board
representation.
Seven of the 10 organizations with low resident/client
representation are branch offices of public agencies; both of
the government funded organizations with high resident/client
representation are food pantries. It appears that government
funding promotes moderate levels of consumer control,
regardless of organization type.
Foundation funded organizations received the highest
control scores in all board categories, ranging from 2.3 in
organizations with high resident/low client representation to
3.0 in organizations with a high percentage of both clients
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and residents on their boards. Among the surveyed
organizations, the combined effect of funding and client board
membership is quite I imi ted; only three respondents, all
community organizations, receive foundation funding and have
boards composed predominately of both residents and clients.
Conclusions
Consumer control in the surveyed organizations is highest
in organizations that receive foundation funding and that have
a majority of both clients and community residents on their
boards of directors. Consumer control (as measured by the
presence or absence of formal access structures) is lowest in
organizations that operate in resource poor environments and
must ration services (often through the use of an income-test)
rather than increase consumer access to services. Consumer
control is also low in organizations that receive government
funding regardless of the percentage of community residents
or clients on their boards of directors. In government funded
organizations, staff members and government regulators set
policy. Board members alone are more likely to make policy
decisions in foundation funded organizations.
The importance of organization budgets to the
implementation of access strategies organization is not
addressed in the social planning literature, however.
Tourginy and Miller (1981) argue that grass-roots funded
organizations are more likely to encourage consumer control
than are organizat ions that rece i ve funding from external
sources. Gilbert and Spect (1974) believe that the social
services planner's preferences are the dominant factor in the
choice of access strategies. The data presented here suggests
that the organization's budget as well as the organization's
ability to fundraise (either from grass-roots sources in
relatively affluent communities or from foundations and
government agencies) is central to the organization's use of
consumer-inclusive access strategies.
These findings have several implications for social work
practice. Organizations that receive funding from several
sources are less likely to become dependent upon a single
funder. External funding from non-restrictive sources appears
to be essential to ensuring consumer control of social welfare
organizations. The combination of foundation funding and
community-based boards of directors helps organizations
serving poor consumers increase access to services.
Government funding is associated with regulations that
restrict the organization's ability to incorporate the needs
and wishes of poor consumers in the service delivery process.
Social workers must advocate to change funding patterns and
regulations that reduce services for poor clients.
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